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Consensus problem in this model, regardless of paat omissions. Our protocol is efficient in that it requires a process to buffer and re-send only the last issued message to overcome omissions.
Generic failure detectors
We study failure detectors in asynchronous environments parametrized by the fault types that they detect, such as crash failure or Byzantine failure, and by a notion of "mutual cooperation": In every failure model, a co-operation predicate -mop -is defined among all pairs of proceasea such that coopP(q) denotes that q is "co-operating" with p. coopP(p) will usually be taken to mean that p is correct. For example, in the crash failure model coopP(q) is chosen to mean "both p and q are correct (not crashed)".
Failure detectors are defined by combination of the properties below; Cornpleterae.w indicates success in detecting processes for which coop is false, and Accuracg indicates the ability to avoid suspecting processes for which coop is true:
If coopP(p) and -coopP(q) then p eventually permanently suspects g.
Weak coop Completeness
If coopP(p) and lcoopP(q) then there is some process r s.t. coop, (p) and r eventually permanently suspects q. Note that in the definitions above p and r may be the same process.
Omission failure model
Using our generic framework we characterize the omission failure model and the failure detector cl~ses in it.
In our model, processes may fail by crashing and in addition messages may be omitted. The members of the largest pervnanentl~connected component in the systeml are considered correct. Processes outside this component are fault y. By a permanently connected component we mean a group of processes that communicate without 10SSand do not receive any meaeages horn processm outside the component. iIembers of a majority connected component are called core processes.
We define an eventual weak failure detector for the omission failure environment, OW(om), satisfying Weak om Completeness and Eventual Weak om Accuracy. Our definition makes use of a majority stability predicate am: ornP (q) holds if p and q are core processes (i.e., belong to a permanently connected majority-component).
Weak om Completeness
If there exists some core process p then for every non-core proce= q there exists some core process r that eventually permanently suspects g.
Eventual
om Weak Accuracy [f there exists some core process p then there exists some core process r such that there is a time after which no core process q suspects r.
In the full paper, we present a protocol for solving l% jresilient Consensus (where n is the number of processes in the system) in the omission failure environment using a failure detector in OW(om). Our protocol is practical in the sense that processes need only buffer and retransmit the last message they sent, and the only source of unfoundedness in the size of messages stems from the need to carry a counter. Finally, we argue that OW(om) is the weakest failure detector for solving [+ j-resilient Consensus in the omiswon failure model.
'if there are two or more such components of equat size deterministically choose one among them.
